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ABSTRACT
When it comes to court packing, questions of “should” and “can”
are inextricably intertwined. The conventional wisdom has long been
that federal court packing is something the President and Congress
simply cannot do. Even though the Constitution’s text does not
directly prohibit expanding or contracting the size of courts for
political gain, many have argued that there is a longstanding norm
against doing so, stemming from a commitment to judicial independ-
ence and separation of powers. And so (the argument goes), even
though the political branches might otherwise be tempted to add or
subtract seats to change the Court’s ideological makeup, for reasons
related to the Constitution and history they should not, meaning for
reasons related to politics they cannot.
But even the strongest norms are susceptible to pressure, and
recent moves by scholars and politicians are calling the conventional
wisdom about court packing into question. Based largely on the
claim that the majority Republican Senate “unpacked” the Supreme
Court by refusing to hold hearings upon the nomination of Judge
Merrick Garland in 2016, some have begun to argue that court
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packing can be done because it recently has been done (by the
political right), and now should be done (by the political left).
Missing in the debate over the positive question—whether court
packing has recently occurred—is that it has unquestionably
happened in the past several years in state courts across the country.
Specifically, in the last decade, there have been legislative attempts
in at least ten states to alter the size of their courts of last resort, with
two being “successful.” Moreover, these figures represent an increase
from the number of attempts in decades past.
This symposium Article makes a gentle intervention in the larger
debate about court packing and the consideration of courts more
generally in these politically charged times. Specifically, it provides
a descriptive account of recent incidents of court packing and un-
packing in state supreme courts. It then examines potential common-
alities among the states in which such measures have been attempted
and then those in which they succeeded. The Article finally considers
whether there are lessons to be drawn for those interested in shift-
ing—or keeping static—the size of the U.S. Supreme Court, including
members of the Court itself.
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to court packing, questions of “should” and “can”
are inextricably intertwined. The conventional wisdom has long
been that federal court packing is something the President and
Congress “just cannot do.”1 Even though the Constitution’s text does
not directly prohibit expanding or contracting the size of courts to
change their political makeup, many have argued that there is a
longstanding norm or convention against doing so.2 This de facto
prohibition largely stems from a commitment to judicial independ-
ence and a sense that court packing would “undermine the ... system
of checks and balances” enshrined in our Constitution.3 And so (the
argument goes), even though the President and Congress might
otherwise be tempted to add or subtract seats to affect the Court’s
ideological composition, for reasons related to the Constitution and
history they should not, meaning for reasons related to politics they
cannot.4
But even the strongest norms are susceptible to pressure,5 and
recent moves by scholars and politicians are calling the conventional
wisdom about court packing into question. Several law professors
have recently put forward proposals that would increase the size of
1. Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional
Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 74 (Matthew
D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009); see also Joshua Braver, Court-Packing: An
American Tradition 2 (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 19-44, 2020), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3483927 [https://perma.cc/B77P-7PWL] (“Since the New
Deal and until recently, court-packing has been taboo, a tactic that no serious politician would
ever publicly entertain.”).
2. See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Convention,
and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 269-87 (2017) (discussing argu-
ments sounding in historical practice and constitutional convention against court packing);
Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465,
505-06 (2018) (noting that “[t]here is a strong norm today against ‘packing’ the Supreme
Court—that is, modifying the Court’s size in order to alter the future course of its decisions”
and arguing that this norm began developing in the late 1950s).
3. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 2, at 276.
4. See id. at 280-83.
5. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1430 (2018) (on the protean nature of constitutional norms, including those
surrounding court packing).
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the Court.6 Those proposals, in turn, have gained traction with
several candidates running for the 2020 Democratic presidential
nomination.7 The underlying argument rests, in part, on a claim
that the majority-Republican Senate “unpacked” the Supreme Court
by refusing to hold hearings upon the nomination of Judge Merrick
Garland in 2016—in effect, the Senate reduced the number of seats
on the Court from nine to eight, for political gain.8 And so, the argu-
ment goes, court packing can be done because it was just recently
done by the Republicans, meaning it should be done by the Demo-
crats in response.
Missing in the debate over the positive question—that is, whether
court packing has recently occurred—is that it has unquestionably
happened in the past several years in state courts across the coun-
try.9 Specifically, in the last decade, there have been attempts by
legislatures in at least ten states to alter the size of their courts of
last resort, with two of those attempts succeeding.10 Moreover, it
appears that attempts to alter the size of state supreme courts is on
6. See Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J.
148, 193-96 (2019) (proposing two different reforms for the Court, including first increasing
the size of the Court from nine to ten Justices—five selected by Democrats and five by
Republicans—and then having those ten Justices, in turn, select another five judges from the
courts of appeals to sit with them for one-year terms); Michael Klarman, Why Democrats
Should Pack the Supreme Court, TAKE CARE (Oct. 15, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/
why-democrats-should-pack-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/2W68-DZX4].
7. See Pema Levy, How Court-Packing Went from a Fringe Idea to a Serious Democratic
Proposal, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/
court-packing-2020/ [https://perma.cc/S6ZC-SA9K] (noting that Pete Buttigieg, Beto O’Rourke,
Elizabeth Warren, Kirsten Gillibrand, and Kamala Harris said that they would not rule out
increasing the number of Justices on the Supreme Court if elected president); see also Philip
Elliott, The Next Big Idea in the Democratic Primary: Expanding the Supreme Court?, TIME
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://time.com/5550325/democrats-court-packing/ [https://perma.cc/ 6LB8-
HN4P].
8. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 6 (describing how court packing is appropriate in light
of the fact that Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell “straight-out stole the seat vacated
by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia” and that the Republican Party has “hijack[ed]” the
Court more broadly); see also Amanda Frost, Academic Highlight: Epps and Sitaraman on
How to Save the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 18, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://www.scotus
blog.com/2018/12/academic-highlight-epps-and-sitaraman-on-how-to-save-the-supreme-court/
[https://perma.cc/6J7N-LUZV] (“[B]y refusing to confirm Obama’s nominee for the [C]ourt,
Congress effectively shrank the [C]ourt to eight during October Term 2016.”).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.A.
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the rise, as the figures reported here represent an increase from the
number of attempts in decades past.11
This symposium Article seeks to make a gentle intervention in
the larger debate about court packing, and the consideration of
courts more generally in these politically charged times. It begins in
Part I by providing a brief overview of the court-packing debate—
and particularly the recent suggestions that court packing be taken
up once again. It then turns in Part II to offer a descriptive account
of recent incidents of court packing and unpacking at the state level.
As part of this discussion, this symposium Article examines poten-
tial commonalities among the states in which such measures have
been attempted and then those in which they ultimately succeeded.
Part III finally considers whether there are lessons to be drawn for
those interested in shifting—or keeping static—the size of the U.S.
Supreme Court, including members of the Court itself.
I. THE DEBATE OVER COURT PACKING AND UNPACKING
The starting point for discussions over court packing12 is almost
invariably President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ill-fated attempt to
increase the size of the Supreme Court in 1937. Feeling both con-
strained by a Court that was declaring many of his New Deal
programs unconstitutional13 and emboldened by his recent electoral
victory—a “landslide”14—FDR proposed a bill to add one Justice to
11. See William E. Raftery, Up, Down, All Around, 100 JUDICATURE 6, 6 (2016) (“The last
decade has seen a dramatic uptick in legislative efforts to change the composition of state
courts of last resort. In the last two years in particular, several states have attempted to
increase or avert a decrease in the number of justices that sit on these courts.”).
12. There are at least a few, different ways that one could define the term “court packing.”
Within this Article, I generally use the term to refer to changing the size of a court in order
to affect its ideological composition generally. This is consistent with the definition put
forward by others. See, e.g., Braver, supra note 1, at 3. That said, I recognize that one could
use it to mean changing the size of a court to achieve a desired outcome in a particular area
of law, to achieve political gains external to the courts, or even some combination of the three.
13. See Grove, supra note 2, at 508 n.242 (citing, among others, Morehead v. New York
ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (holding a New York minimum wage law for women
unconstitutional); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 317 (1936) (holding that the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 exceeded congressional powers under the
Commerce Clause); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542-51
(1935) (striking down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act)).
14. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FDR’s ‘Court-Packing’ Plan, https://www.fjc.gov/history/
timeline/fdrs-court-packing-plan [https://perma.cc/2RRL-W3D6]; William E. Leuchtenburg,
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the Court for each one over the age of seventy who did not retire
within six months (up to fifteen Justices total).15 As history is told,
the Justices took notice and began upholding various programs and
regulations of the like they had previously declared unconstitu-
tional—the so-called “switch in time that saved ... nine.”16 FDR’s
plan to expand the Court “went down to defeat,”17 and was cast as
a “political disaster.”18
Given the notoriety of Roosevelt’s plan, one could be forgiven for
skimming over the fact that the Court has not always been com-
posed of nine Justices. Indeed, as others have well documented,
Congress repeatedly altered the size of the Supreme Court in the
1800s—and did so, at least in part, “for partisan reasons.”19
The Supreme Court was initially set at six Justices by the
Judiciary Act of 1789.20 That figure changed in 1801, when the
outgoing Federalist Congress passed the infamous Judiciary Act of
that year (also known as the “Midnight Judges Act”21), which re-
duced the Court to five Justices by attrition22 (an apparent attempt
to rob the incoming president, Thomas Jefferson, of making the next
appointment).23 1802 saw the formal restoration of the sixth seat,
The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing” Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 380. 
15. See PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION TO REORGANIZE JUDICIAL
BRANCH, H.R. Doc. No. 75-142, at 9-10 (1937).
16. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 232 (2009). Whether the “switch” and,
in particular, Justice Owen Roberts’s vote in conference were brought about by the announce-
ment of the court-packing plan or if the Court’s decisions in the spring of 1937 only helped to
deflect any support in Congress for the plan is a matter of scholarly debate. See, e.g., Daniel
E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did A Switch in Time Save Nine? 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 71 (2010)
(noting how scholars have “battled for decades” over the role and motivation of Justice
Roberts, and citing to works within the academic debate).
17. William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, a Second Death,
1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 673.
18. Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165, 2167 (1999);
see also Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 103, 131 (describing how FDR’s court-packing plan was in “dire shape politically” even
before the Justices changed their stance and noting how “[t]wo-thirds of the newspapers that
had endorsed FDR came out immediately and vociferously against the plan” on the grounds
that “FDR was seeking ‘dictatorial powers’”).
19. Grove, supra note 2, at 507; see also Braver, supra note 1, at 25-39.
20. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73.
21. See Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 494, 494 (1961).
22. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89, 89.
23. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 2, at 271.
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courtesy of the Repeal Act of that year.24 The Court’s size steadily
increased over the next half century—first rising to seven Justices
in 1807,25 and then to nine Justices in 1837.26 Congress expanded
the Supreme Court to ten in 186327—a move understood to allow
President Abraham Lincoln to shift the Court favorably toward the
Republican agenda at the time.28 Following President Lincoln’s
assassination and Andrew Johnson’s assumption of the office,
Congress, in 1866, “unpacked” the Court—reducing the number of
seats to seven.29 Three years later, and with a new Republican
President, Ulysses S. Grant, in office, the Republican Congress
increased the size of the Court to nine Justices.30 Notwithstanding
FDR’s attempts to have it be otherwise, the Court has held constant
at nine seats ever since, for 150 years.
Despite a repeated pattern of expansion and contraction in the
Court’s first hundred years, many have argued in this century that
the Court can no longer be altered for political gain.31 This turn-
about can be largely traced back to FDR’s failed attempt to pack
the Court and its aftermath. As Tara Grove has persuasively
written, government officials—Democrat and Republican— “increas-
ingly treated Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing plan as a negative
precedent” in the decades that followed, which in turn led to it being
24. See Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, §§ 1, 3, 2 Stat. 132, 132. As there was never a vacancy,
the Court did not actually contract during this time. See Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT.
U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/CE3S-FJTZ].
25. See Seventh Circuit Act of 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420, 421.
26. See Eighth & Ninth Circuits Act of 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176, 176.
27. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794, 794.
28. See Grove, supra note 2, at 507.
29. See Judiciary Act of 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209, 209; see also Ian Bartrum,
Kathryn Nyman & Peter Otto, Justice as Fair Division, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 531, 535 (2018) (“In
1866, Congress reduced the number to seven to prevent President Andrew Johnson from
appointing any new members.”).
30. See Circuit Judges Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44.
31. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural Judiciary:
On the Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1063-
64 (2014) (“Now ... we have a constitutional custom, or constitutional common law, under
which court packing is essentially considered a wholly illegitimate means of seeking to alter
existing Supreme Court doctrine.” (footnote omitted)); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the
Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 15 n.50 (2014) (suggesting that “it may be unthinkable
today that Congress would” pack the Supreme Court, while noting that other scholars have
emphasized that it is technically a legally available option).
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understood as “off the table” in more recent times.32 In other words,
FDR’s court-packing proposal became viewed more and more as
something he should not have put forward, making any subsequent
attempt at court packing less and less likely.
And yet, as noted at the outset, there is something of a push-pull
relationship between the positive and the normative when it comes
to the court-packing debate. Once such reforms became taboo, they
in turn became precisely the sort of thing one could accuse the
political opposition of attempting, thereby justifying any future
attempt to “pack the courts” in response.33 Indeed, as Grove
catalogues, Republicans charged Democrats with court packing in
2013, when the Senate Democratic majority altered the traditional
filibuster rule, thereby enabling lower federal court judge confir-
mation by majority vote—and specifically enabling President
Obama to fill three vacancies on the D.C. Circuit.34 Although the
Democrats disputed the claims of court packing at the time—
President Obama emphasized that “[w]e’re not adding seats here....
I didn’t just wake up one day and say, let’s add three seats to the
[D.C. Circuit]”35—the Republicans continued to cast the episode in
those terms.36 Then, when the Republicans blocked the nomination
of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court upon the death of
Justice Scalia, Senator Lindsey Graham brought forward the
purported justification: “I did tell (then-Senate Majority Leader)
Harry Reid and the [P]resident that the consequence of changing
the rules in the Senate to pack the [C]ourt will come back to haunt
them.”37
32. See Grove, supra note 2, at 506.
33. See id. at 515-16.
34. See id.
35. Remarks on the Nomination of Patricia A. Millett, Cornelia T.L. “Nina” Pillard, and
Robert L. Wilkins to Be Judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, 1 PUB. PAPERS 524, 526 (June 4, 2013); see also, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. 16,591
(2013) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“First [Senate Republicans] asserted that the President is
somehow packing the court by nominating judges to vacant seats. No student of history can
honestly say that nominating candidates to existing vacancies is court-packing.”).
36. See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. 16,594 (2013) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (“I think the
evidence is overwhelming that what the President is trying to do by nominating these
unneeded judges to [the D.C. Circuit], the second most powerful court in the Nation, is he is
trying to pack the court in order to affect the outcomes.”).
37. See GOP Insists Obama Leave Supreme Court Seat Open, DENVER POST (Feb. 14, 2016,
2:40 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2016/02/14/gop-insists-obama-leave-supreme-court-
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This brings us to the present moment in the court-packing debate.
Although those on the political right might argue that the failed
Garland nomination was the “tit” for the Democrats’ earlier fili-
buster “tat,”38 many of those on the political left see the matter
differently. Specifically, there are those who argue that by holding
open Justice Scalia’s seat, the Republicans shrank or “unpacked”
the Court by one Justice.39 And so, the argument goes, because court
packing has been done, it can be done again40—and now should be
done in response.
One cannot know if we have reached an inflection point in the
court-packing debate, but it does seem safe to say that there is more
momentum in favor of such reform than there has been of late. As
Joshua Braver has argued, “At no time since the New Deal has the
possibility of court-packing been under such serious discussion.”41
This shift is largely due to moves by scholars and politicians. In the
words of Amanda Frost, “scholars have dusted off the idea of ‘pack-
ing’ the Supreme Court.”42 Here, Frost points to Michael Klarman’s
recent arguments43 and further gestures at new proposals by Daniel
Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman, one of which would expand the Court
to fifteen Justices (though Epps and Sitaraman propose doing so in
an attempt to move the Court above the political fray).44 As noted
earlier, several of the current candidates for the Democratic
presidential nomination have declared themselves open to increas-
ing the membership of the Court,45 with one embracing Epps and
seat-open/ [https://perma.cc/6REN-PYQL]; see also Grove, supra note 2, at 516.
38. See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. S2185 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2017) (statement of Sen. Cornyn)
(beginning by describing the events of 2013, when “President Obama really wanted to see on
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ... more of his Democratic nominees.... So ... Senator Harry
Reid changed the cloture rules ... to pack the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals .... So in a way, we
are coming full circle.”).
39. See supra note 8.
40. For an important discussion of the malleability and indeterminacy of historical
“precedents” more generally, see Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles
and the Search for a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96 (2017) (focusing on arguments sur-
rounding judicial appointments).
41. Braver, supra note 1, at 8.
42. Frost, supra note 8.
43. Id. (citing Klarman, supra note 6).
44. See id. (citing Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 6).
45. See Levy, supra note 7.
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Sitaraman’s plan.46 And indeed recent poll numbers show that there
may be movement in public opinion on the issue. A fall 2019 survey
from Marquette Law School showed that respondents opposed
expanding the Court by a 57 percent to 43 percent margin, with
registered Democrats evenly split on the proposition.47 As Tara
Grove noted, even this level of support represents a “sea change”
from times past.48
In the midst of what appears to be a key moment in the court-
packing debate—and indeed, in larger discussions about the role
and treatment of courts in politically charged times—it is critical to
consider another set of data points. That is, while we argue about
whether court packing has occurred recently in the federal courts,
it is worth considering that it has unquestionably occurred recent-
ly in the state courts. Part II, then, provides a descriptive analysis
of attempts (and successes) to alter the size of state supreme courts
to present a thicker, and more nuanced, account of court packing
generally.
II. COURT PACKING AND UNPACKING AT THE STATE LEVEL
Absent from the larger debate about court packing has been a dis-
cussion of what is occurring in the states. One reason for this
absence may be that a majority of state supreme court justices are
not appointed but elected,49 making those courts more political by
46. Josh Lederman, Inside Pete Buttigieg’s Plan to Overhaul the Supreme Court, NBC
NEWS (June 3, 2019, 6:03 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/inside-pete-
buttigieg-s-plan-overhaul-supreme-court-n1012491 [https://perma.cc/LB64-59W8].
47. See Charles H. Franklin, Public Views of the Supreme Court, MARQ. U. L. SCH.
(October 2019), https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MULawPoll Su-
premeCourtReportOct2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SKZ-VYTG].
48. Robert Barnes, Polls Show Trust in Supreme Court, but There Is Growing Interest in
Fixed Terms and Other Changes, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2019, 1:52 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/polls-show-trust-in-supreme-court-but-there-is-
growing-interest-in-fixed-terms-and-other-changes/2019/10/24/dcbbcba4-f6fc-11ed-8cf0-
4cc99f74d127_ story.html [https://perma.cc/AC95-A9LN].
49. According to a recent report by the Brennan Center for Justice, states select their
supreme court justices in the following ways: fifteen through nonpartisan elections; fourteen
first through gubernatorial appointment from a merit selection commission and subsequently
through retention elections; ten through gubernatorial appointment; six through partisan
elections; four through a hybrid of appointive and elective selection methods; and two through
legislative appointment. See Judicial Selection: An Interactive Map, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, http://judicialselectionmap.brennancenter.org/?court=Supreme [https://perma.cc/
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nature and potentially an inapposite point of comparison—an argu-
ment I consider more below.50 Another reason may be that state
courts tend to be understudied in the academic literature more
generally.51 And this phenomenon, in turn, may be at least partially
explained by the fact that, relative to the federal courts, they are
challenging subjects of study.
To consider what changes have been made to the size of the state
supreme courts over the past decade, one needs to sort through the
activity of fifty different legislative bodies. For the purposes of this
study, I began my inquiry with the invaluable database of state
legislation affecting the courts, Gavel to Gavel, which is run by the
National Center for State Courts.52 After consulting with the
National Center,53 I focused my search on those changes that have
been categorized as “structural” (as opposed to related to jurisdic-
tion, selection, budget, and the like).54 Within this category, I
searched for any legislation with the words “expand,” “increase,”
“reduce,” and “decrease” so as to capture as many attempts to “pack”
and “unpack” the courts as possible. I then further narrowed the
search by focusing on legislation that only affected the state’s high-
est court. Finally, I ran additional searches of past Gavel to Gavel
newsletters, which note legislative attempts to change supreme
QWR2-XWVP]. For a thoughtful discussion of the history of different selection procedures, see
F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the State
Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431 (2004).
50. See infra Part III.
51. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 191, 214 (2012) (noting additional areas for future research, including the
“understudied state courts”); see also Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, AM. CONSTITUTION
SOC’Y, The Gavel Gap: Who Sits in Judgment on State Courts? 2 (2016), https://gavel
gap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP4X-XJYK] (“For most individuals and
organizations, state courts are the ‘law’ for all effective purposes. State courts are America’s
courts. But, we know surprisingly little about who serves on state courts—i.e., state
judges—despite their central and powerful role.”).
52. See About, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS: GAVEL TO GAVEL, http://gaveltogavel.us/
about/ [https://perma.cc/6ZNL-Y563].
53. Specifically, I corresponded with the National Center’s Senior Knowledge and
Information Services Analyst, who maintains the database. See, e.g., Email from William
Raftery, Senior Knowledge and Information Services Analyst, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, to
author (July 15, 2019, 16:23 EDT) (on file with author). Mr. Raftery maintains the Gavel to
Gavel database.
54. See Database, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.: GAVEL TO GAVEL, http://gaveltogavel.us/
database/ [https://perma.cc/8CWN-L65B] (click the “Type” dropbox to view the various
categories of legislation).
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court composition.55 The cumulative search yielded over twenty
results in eleven different states over ten years, described in detail
below.56
Before turning to the descriptive analysis, a few caveats are in
order. First, as the preceding discussion makes plain, this Article’s
focus is only on attempts to alter the ideological composition of state
supreme courts by adding seats to or subtracting seats from the
bench. I have not included the myriad of other efforts to affect the
composition of the courts through other means—for example, by
modifying the selection process for justices.57 I will simply note here
that those efforts also deserve our attention and hope that they will
be taken up in future scholarship.
Second, and also noted above, the search was restricted to the
highest court in each state—the state supreme court or its equiv-
alent.58 This was done to provide the most pertinent examples for
the debate over federal court packing and unpacking. Accordingly,
proposed changes to the size of other courts—for example, to reduce
the Oklahoma Workers Compensation Court from ten to seven
judges in 200959—are not included. This further means that even
proposals to alter the size of intermediate appellate courts—for
example, to reduce the size of the North Carolina Court of Appeals,60
which was cast as politically motivated61—are not included. If
55. See, e.g., William Raftery, Arizona: New Plan to Stock Supreme Court Introduced and
Clears Committee in Hours; Over a Dozen Efforts to Change Supreme Court Composition in
Last Decade, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.: GAVEL TO GAVEL (Feb. 12, 2015), http://gavel
togavel.us/2015/02/12/arizona-new-plan-to-stack-supreme-court-introduced-and-clears-
committee-in-hours-over-a-dozen-efforts-to-change-supreme-court-composition-in-last-decade/
[https://perma.cc/4XCL-5NKY].
56. See infra Part II.A.
57. For example, Iowa recently changed its process for selecting its Supreme Court
justices, with charges by Democrats that Republicans enacted the change for political gain.
See Stephen Gruber-Miller, Kim Reynolds Signs Bill Giving Governors More Power Over Iowa
Supreme Court Selection, DES MOINES REG. (May 8, 2019, 7:43 PM), https://www.desmoines
register.com/story/news/politics/2019/05/08/kim-reynolds-signs-changes-giving-governors-
more-power-over-iowa-supreme-appeals-court-selection/1142445001/ [https://perma.cc/Z2U7-
LMXP].
58. Notably the New York Court of Appeals is that state’s highest appellate court. See
Court of Appeals, ST. N.Y., https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/ [https://perma.cc/JAJ9-4TTR].
59. See S.B. 609, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009).
60. See H.B. 239, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017).
61. See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, In North Carolina, Republicans Stung by Court Rulings Aim
to Change the Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/
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anything, the decision to focus solely on the courts of last resort will
lead to an underestimate of the extent to which legislatures are
altering the size of courts for political gain.
Third, the data below might be underinclusive in additional ways.
This is due to the sheer number of states and the legislative activity
generated by them. Indeed, according to the National Center for
State Court’s Senior Knowledge and Information Services Analyst,
the Center has roughly 10,000 bills in its database and tracks an
approximate 600 additional bills each year.62 I relied upon what
appeared as the most common phrases in bills to alter the size of a
state’s supreme court when searching for the relevant legislation
and conducted further searches on the Gavel to Gavel site, but it is
possible that some proposals were missed. For example, a legislative
attempt to increase the overall number of justices on the Florida
Supreme Court in 2011 by restructuring the court into two larger
courts (one civil and one criminal)63 was not detected in the initial
database search, as the bill’s description focused on the restructur-
ing.64 A subsequent review within Gavel to Gavel identified the
bill,65 but again, I cannot be certain that others were not overlooked.
If anything, as with the point directly above, this has the potential
to understate the number of cases, though I readily acknowledge
that it also has the potential to limit the observations that can be
made in Part II.B.66
us/north-carolina-republicans-gerrymander-judges-.html [https://perma.cc/C2PB-42L6]. By
way of full disclosure, the Author filed an amicus brief in the litigation about the General
Assembly’s attempt to reduce the size of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in support of
plaintiff-appellant Governor Roy A. Cooper, III. See Brief of Professor Marin K. Levy as
Amicus Curiae in Cooper v. Berger, 824 S.E. 2d 403 (N.C. 2019) (No. 315PA18).
62. See Email from William Raftery, Senior Knowledge and Information Services Analyst,
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, to author (Aug. 14, 2019, 9:34 AM) (on file with author).
63. See H.B. 7199, 2011 Leg., 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011).
64. See Database: Description of Florida H.B. 7199, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.: GAVEL TO
GAVEL, http://gaveltogavel.us/database/ [https://perma.cc/8CWN-L65B] (select “Florida” in the
“State” drop-down box; then select “Structure Changes” in the “Type” drop-down box; then
select “2011” in the “Year” drop-down box; then click “Search Bills”) (“[H.B. 7199] [s]tatutorily
implements HJR 7111 [by] splitting supreme court into civil and criminal divisions.”).
65. See William Raftery, Florida: So When Is HJR 7111 Appearing on the Ballot? And Why
Does It Matter?, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.: GAVEL TO GAVEL (June 20, 2011), http://gavelto
gavel.us/2011/06/20/florida-so-when-is-hjr-7111-appearing-on-the-ballot-and-why-does-it-
matter-2/ [https://perma.cc/2ZNS-F4T9].
66. See infra Part II.B.
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Finally, the findings below are examples of attempts (and suc-
cesses) by state legislatures to alter the size of their courts. Whether
those attempts were motivated purely by politics is a question that
cannot be answered here. That said, one can reasonably conclude
that there is at least a colorable claim of partisan motivation to
affect the high court’s ideological composition in nearly every
instance, which is documented below. As such, the legislative
activity discussed here appears to provide useful data points for the
larger court-packing debate.
A. States that Have Changed and Attempted to Change the
Size of Their Highest Courts
In the past decade alone, there have been numerous attempts in
state legislatures to alter the size of state high courts. Several of
those attempts have come in the form of “packing”—meaning an
intent to add seats to an existing court. But several more have come
in the form of “unpacking”—meaning an intent to eliminate seats
(often upon the next retirement of a justice or set of justices.)67 This
Section catalogues both types of proposals, beginning with court-
packing attempts and successes, in alphabetical order of the states
within each category. Success for the purposes of this Article is
defined by whether the proposed bill ultimately passed into law. The
Article will consider in Part III whether the legislation was “success-
ful” in the sense that it yielded results consistent with what the
legislature and/or governor appeared to have intended.
1. Court-Packing Attempts and Successes
The first attempt to expand the size of a high court considered
here comes from Arizona. That attempt ultimately succeeded, but
only after a few false starts (and several years).68 Specifically, in
2011, Arizona State Senator Ron Gould, a Republican,69 introduced
67. For example, consider a proposal to reduce the size of the Alabama Supreme Court,
see infra note 163 and accompanying text. Of course, this is not always the way “unpackings”
are effectuated. Consider a proposal to reduce the size of the Washington Supreme Court by
requiring the justices to draw lots, see infra note 158 and accompanying text.
68. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
69. See Arizona State Legislature, Senate Member, Ron Gould, https://www.azleg.gov/
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Arizona Senate Bill 1481, which sought to amend Section 12-101 of
the Arizona Revised Statutes to increase the size of the Arizona
Supreme Court from five to seven justices.70 The Senate Judiciary
Committee held a hearing on the bill, at which then-Chief Justice
Rebecca White Berch appeared to speak against it.71 In a remark-
able interbranch exchange, the Committee called forward the Chief
Justice, mistakenly referring to her as “Rebecca Berch ... from the
Arizona Judicial Council.”72 The Chief Justice then began her
testimony:
Actually I’m the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court ... and in
that capacity, I was surprised by the bill and surprised to be
surprised by the bill. Here’s a bill that proposes to change my
court and no one asked me about it. Had I been asked, here’s
what I might have said. We’re one of the entities of government
... that’s actually current in its workload.... And this particular
bill ... we’ve estimated the cost of this at about a million dollars
per year and ongoing.... So given this economic climate, it’s just
hard to justify this bill at this time.73
Moments later, the Committee took a vote.74 The bill’s main sponsor
sought permission to explain on the record why he had put it for-
ward, and then said, “I just thought that I might give the oppor-
tunity for two additional attorneys to sit on the Supreme Court.”75
Nevertheless, the Committee voted Senate Bill 1481 down.76
Four years later, however, members of the legislature again at-
tempted to expand the size of the Arizona Supreme Court. In 2015,
House Bill 2076 was introduced, which originally spoke to the
senate-member/?legislature=48&legislator=1038 [https://perma.cc/8CVV-G9R9].
70. See S.B. 1481, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/
GetDocumentPdf/206385 [https://perma.cc/3CBE-RMJ5]. Additionally, the bill replaced the
term “judges” with “justices.” Id.
71. Hearing on S.B. 1481 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
1:06:54 (Ariz. 2011), http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=8353
[https://perma.cc/5QA2-WHNC].
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1:07:11-1:08:18.
74. Id. at 1:09:00.
75. Id. at 1:09:56; see also Raftery, supra note 55.
76. Hearing on S.B. 1481 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 71, at 1:10:20-
1:10:26.
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representation of corporations in court.77 That bill’s contents were
then struck completely, and new language mirroring Arizona Senate
Bill 1481 was added instead, seeking to expand the Supreme Court
from five to seven justices.78 The new Arizona House Bill 2076 was
voted out of committee, but ultimately died on the floor of the
house.79
The same amendment was then proposed in January 2016 in the
form of Arizona House Bill 2537.80 This time, the Republican-
controlled legislature approved the measure.81 Just as his predeces-
sor did, the new Chief Justice, Scott Bales, objected.82 Specifically,
the Chief Justice wrote to the governor urging him to veto the bill:
“Additional justices are not required by the Court’s caseload, and an
expansion of the Court ... is not warranted when other court-related
needs are underfunded.”83 Several news outlets at the time called
the Republican-sponsored bill an attempt to “[b]ring [b]ack [c]ourt-
[p]acking,” noting that the Republican governor, Doug Ducey, would
himself select the new justices from a list created by the Arizona
Commission on Appellate Court Appointments.84 Days later, the
77. H.B. 2076, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2015), https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/Get
DocumentPdf/404428 [https://perma.cc/CWQ3-AFF2].
78. See Raftery, supra note 55.
79. See Bill Raftery, Arizona: For Third Time in 5 Years, Legislature Attempts to Expand
Supreme Court from 5 to 7, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.: GAVEL TO GAVEL (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://gaveltogavel.us/2016/02/01/arizona-for-third-time-in-5-years-legislature-attempts-to-
expand-supreme-court-from-5-to-7/ [https://perma.cc/9UK2-JVA6].
80. See H.B. 2537, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016), https://apps.azleg.gov/Bill
Status/GetDocumentPdf/434697 [https://perma.cc/N4KA-VJWC].
81. See Bill History, H.B. 2537, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016), https://apps.azleg.gov/
BillStatus/BillOverview/?BillNumber=hb2537&SessionID=115 [https://perma.cc/AUF3-
TYVX].
82. Letter from Scott Bales, Chief Justice, Ariz. Supreme Court, to Doug Ducey, Governor,
State of Ariz. (May 5, 2016), https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=http://archive.az
central.com/persistent/icimages/politics/ScottBalesvetoletter05052016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XFS2-XQBQ].
83. Id.
84. See Steve Benen, Arizona Scheme Raises ‘Court Packing’ Questions, MSNBC:
MADDOWBLOG (May 13, 2016, 11:20 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/
arizona-scheme-raises-court-packing-questions [https://perma.cc/99Y5-88YZ]; Russell Berman,
Arizona Republicans Try to Bring Back Court-Packing, ATLANTIC (May 10, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/court-packing-enjoys-a-political-
renaissance/481758/ [https://perma.cc/9LX3-JJUP]; Linda Valdez, Ducey’s Careful Timing on
Court Packing Bill, AZCENTRAL (May 18, 2016, 10:34 AM), https://www.azcentral.com/
story/opinion/op-ed/lindavaldez/2016/05/18/valdez-duceys-careful-timing-court-packing-
bill/84544772/ [https://perma.cc/A83L-ML4C].
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governor signed the bill into law, arguing that “[a]dding more voices
will ensure that the courts can increase efficiency, hear more cases
and issue more opinions.”85 The two additional justices, Andrew
Gould and John Lopez IV, took their seats in December 2016.86
A similar set of changes to the judiciary was enacted in Georgia.
And as in Arizona, the attempts to expand the courts in Georgia
took several years, and began with a few missteps. In late 2006,
Leah Ward Sears, then-Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court,
told state lawmakers that “We are doing well. We are getting it
done. We have the manpower we need.”87 The Chief Justice’s
comments appear to have been in response to proposals the legis-
lature was considering at the time to expand the size of the Court
from seven to nine justices.88 What followed in the 2007-08 Regular
Session was the introduction of Georgia Senate Resolution 370,
which proposed amending the Georgia Constitution to ultimately
increase the court from seven to thirteen justices.89 Georgia Senate
Resolution 370 ended up stalling and in February 2010, Georgia
Senate Bill 429 was introduced “so as to increase the number of
Justices of the Supreme Court to nine Justices” from seven, and
“increase the number of judges of the Court of Appeals to 15 Judges”
from 12.90 This attempt had the virtue of not increasing the
Supreme Court beyond the maximum set by the Georgia Constitu-
tion (thereby avoiding the need for a constitutional amendment, as
85. Statement of Gov. Ducey on Signing House Bill 2537 (May 18, 2016), https://az
governor.gov/sites/default/files/hb_2537_signing_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV48-JHV3].
86. Howard Fischer, Ducey Adds Two New Justices to Arizona Supreme Court, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR (Dec. 18, 2016), https://tucson.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/ducey-adds-two-new-
justices-to-arizona-supreme-court/article_6b65196d-fec3-5664-8930-3e6230082b1b.html
[https://perma.cc/TX7G-PB3A].
87. Bill Raftery, Over a Dozen Efforts to Alter Number of State Supreme Court Justices
Almost All Related to “Packing” the Courts, in the Last Several Years, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.:
GAVEL TO GAVEL (Feb. 5, 2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/2013/02/05/over-a-dozen-efforts-to-alter-
number-of-state-supreme-court-justices-almost-all-related-to-packing-the-courts-in-last-
several-years/ [https://perma.cc/XL79-3FMG] (linking to Jeremy Redmon, Chief Justice: Leave
Court Alone, Sears Rebuffs Push to Add Seats, Make Elections Partisan, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
Dec. 13, 2006, at A1).
88. Id.
89. See S.R. 370, 2007 Gen. Assemb., 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007), http://www.legis.
ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/20072008/SR/370 [https://perma.cc/95U5-YNJ8]; Raftery,
supra note 55.
90. S.B. 429, 2010 Gen. Assemb., 2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010), http://www.legis.ga.gov/
Legislation/en-US/display/20092010/SB/429.pdf [https://perma.cc/865N-UF8V].
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Georgia Senate Resolution 370 required).91 Nevertheless, Georgia
Senate Bill 429 died in committee.92
But just as in Arizona, lawmakers in Georgia persisted and
ultimately succeeded in enlarging their state supreme court.
Specifically, in 2016, the Republican-controlled Georgia General
Assembly considered a sweeping reform bill, intended not only to
expand the supreme court from seven to nine justices, but also to
restructure the appellate jurisdiction and procedures for the high
court and the court of appeals.93 There was considerable speculation
that the Republican governor was interested in expanding the court
purely for political reasons; at the time, Georgia had four Demo-
cratic appointees and only three Republican ones.94 And in Georgia,
the governor has full autonomy in selecting justices.95 Over accusa-
tions of court packing,96 the General Assembly passed the bill in the
spring of 2016, and the governor promptly signed it.97 By the next
calendar year, the governor had filled the two new seats, resulting
in a “more conservative-leaning court[ ].”98
Other states have similarly seen attempts to increase the number
of seats on their highest courts. In Florida in 2007, the Florida
Legislature briefly considered Florida Senate Bill 408, which sought
to enlarge the Florida Supreme Court from seven to fifteen justices
91. See id.; S.R. 370, supra note 89.
92. See Database Entry for SB 429, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.: GAVEL TO GAVEL,
http://gaveltogavel.us/database/ [https://perma.cc/3UFJ-GS5H] (follow link; select “Georgia,”
“All,” and “2010” in drop-down menus; click “Search Bills” and scroll down to find SB 429).
93. See H.B. 927, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016), http://www.
legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/Display/20152016/HB/927 [https://perma.cc/P5UJ-KKX4].
94. Jim Galloway, Enlarging Georgia’s Supreme Court Bench: A GOP Insurance Policy,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/enlarging-georgia-
supreme-court-bench-gop-insurance-policy/ISj29YwSROUY5Mi61DQ3AN/ [https://perma.cc/
A246-BLYS].
95. See Bill Raftery, Plans to Add 2 Justices to the Arizona and Georgia Supreme Courts
Pass Committee Hurdles; Critics Call Them Court Packing Plans, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.:
GAVEL TO GAVEL (Mar. 17, 2016), http://gaveltogavel.us/2016/03/17/plans-add-2-justices-
arizona-georgia-supreme-courts-pass-committee-hurdles-final-floor-votes-happen-
soon/?doing_wp_cron= 1565407782.0958790779113769531250 [https://perma.cc/PV9F-T6B4].
96. See, e.g., id.
97. See 2015-2016 Regular Session - HB 927 "Appellate Jurisdiction Reform Act of 2016",
GA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/Display/20152016/HB/927
[https://perma.cc/ZBW3-2GPS].
98. Bill Rankin, A New Era for Georgia’s Highest Court, ATLANTA J.CONST. (Jan. 9,
2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/new-era-for-georgia-highest-court/U8aXCg22yOsshB
PrGJtfCO/ [https://perma.cc/JJ43-BULX].
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via an amendment to the state constitution.99 Unlike some of the
other proposed bills, which were couched in terms of increasing
efficiency,100 Florida Senate Bill 408 stated explicitly that it was in
response to a prior ruling of the state supreme court.101 Specifically,
the opening sentences of the bill read in part: “the Legislature ...
finds that the majority decision by the Florida Supreme Court in
Bush v. Holmes ... was specious in its posture regarding the doctrine
of judicial restraint and was the equivalent of judicial activism in
policymaking.”102 (The court’s decision in Holmes found the Florida
school voucher system unconstitutional, by a vote of five to two.)103
The proposed legislation was decried as an attempt to pack the
court with “eight new Republican-friendly appointments”—and
called a “ham-fisted and unsophisticated” one at that.104 Two days
after being referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the joint
resolution was withdrawn.105 In an apparent attempt to distance
himself from the bill, its author, Republican State Senator Bill
Posey, told the media, “a law student came up with the idea and
asked me to have it drafted so he could see how it would look, but it
was never supposed to be introduced.”106
But Florida Senate Bill 408 is not the Florida Legislature’s only
recent attempt to add justices to the Florida Supreme Court—or
Courts.107 Four years later, Florida House Joint Resolution 7111,
introduced by four Republican members of the house, proposed to
revise the state constitution to increase the number of supreme
court justices again, this time by splitting the court into two.108 The
99. S.B. 408, 2007 S., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2007), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/
2007/408/BillText/Filed/PDF [https://perma.cc/353K-TLAE].
100. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
101. See S.B. 408, supra note 99.
102. Id.
103. See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 412-13 (Fla. 2006); see also Recent Case, Bush v.
Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1097-99 (2007).
104. Frank Cerabino, Another Year, Another Try to Oust Supreme Court Justices, PALM
BEACH POST (Oct. 7, 2014, 10:23 PM), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/article/20141007/
NEWS/812054535 [https://perma.cc/8M5Q-EYNP].
105. See Bill History: SB 408: Fla. Supreme Court/Justices Increase, FLA. SENATE, https://
www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2007/408/?Tab=BillHistory [https://perma.cc/D53Z-8XVN].
106. Bill Cotterell, Sorry Charlie: No New Justices to Appoint, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT,
Jan. 8, 2007, at B1.
107. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 7111, 22d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011), https://www.flsenate.gov/
Session/Bill/2011/7111/BillText/Filed/PDF [https://perma.cc/89YF-JT92].
108. Id.
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two new supreme courts, one civil and one criminal, would require
an additional three justices added to the bench.109 But the rub was
that the resolution called for the current supreme court to “rank all
of the justices then in office by seniority in service,” with the three
most senior justices110—who happened to be Democratic ap-
pointees111—to be posted to the criminal supreme court.112 An article
in a local Florida newspaper put it thus: “The maneuver would move
the three most liberal justices ... into the criminal division, leaving
the Republican-friendly justices as the ultimate arbiter of all the
borderline constitutional civil matters that [the Republican gover-
nor] and the Republican-state legislature had in mind.”113 That plan
passed in the house, though ultimately failed in the Florida
senate.114
As in Florida, lawmakers in Iowa were arguably motivated to
increase the size of the state supreme court in the wake of a
controversial ruling. Following the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2009
decision in Varnum v. Brien to strike down a state law limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples,115 the Iowa Legislature considered
amending the Iowa Constitution so as to increase the size of the
court to nine.116 Doing so would provide the governor the opportu-
nity to select the additional justices from a list provided by a
nominating commission.117 That bill, sponsored by Republican
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Raftery, supra note 55.
112. H.J. Res. 7111, supra note 107.
113. Cerabino, supra note 104.
114. See Fla. H.J. Res. 7111, Bill History, FLA. SENATE, https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/
Bill/2011/7111/?Tab=BillHistory [https://perma.cc/T6QT-YCH6]; see also Raftery, supra note
11, at 7 (describing how the joint resolution cleared the house but ultimately died in the
senate). It is worth observing that the civil court need not be the more “important” one.
Indeed, had Florida had a two-court system earlier, it is quite possible that the criminal court
would have decided a larger share of controversial cases between the 1960s and 1980s, in the
realm of criminal procedure. This is simply to note the degree of historical contingency in
some of these arrangements. With thanks to Josh Chafetz for this point.
115. 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009).
116. H.J. Res. 2012, 83d Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2010), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/legislation/
BillBook?ga=83&ba=HJR%202012 [https://perma.cc/X79W-YSS8]; see also Raftery, supra note
55 (“After all 7 justices ruled in favor of same-sex marriage in the state, HJR 2012 would have
expanded the court to 9.”).
117. Judicial Selection and Retention, IOWA JUD. BRANCH, https://www.iowacourts.gov/ for-
the-public/judicial-selection-and-retention [https://perma.cc/7SAP-2V42].
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Representative Rod Roberts, was referred to the Judiciary Commit-
tee and nothing more came of it.118 This may be because Democrats
controlled both houses and the governorship at the time.119 Though
it is also worth noting that three of the “offending” justices were
voted out of office the following November following a substantial
recall campaign, thereby creating three new nominations for the
newly elected Republican governor.120
The South Carolina Legislature has also considered bills to
amend the state constitution to increase the number of justices on
the bench. But the story is somewhat more complicated in the
Palmetto State. According to Gavel to Gavel, Democrats introduced
legislation to amend the state constitution to increase the South
Carolina Supreme Court from five to seven justices in every leg-
islative session for nearly twenty years.121 As Bill Raftery noted,
118. Bill History for House Joint Resolution 2012, IOWA LEGISLATURE, https://www.legis.
iowa.gov/legislation/billTracking/billHistory?billName=HJR%202012&ga=83&print=true
[https://perma.cc/2JKL-6HM9].
119. See Party Control of Iowa State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Party_control_of_Iowa_state_government [https://perma.cc/3L3K-FS4L].
120. See Lee Rood, Justices Ousted Over Gay Marriage Ruling Worry About Politics
Affecting the Bench, DES MOINES REG. (Oct. 29, 2016, 4:37 PM), https://www.desmoines
register.com/story/news/2016/10/29/justices-ousted-over-gay-marriage-ruling-worry-politics-
affecting-bench/92786554/ [https://perma.cc/Q4VS-3UEF]; A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa
Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/
2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html [https://perma.cc/WJ6K-9V5G]. Legislative attempts to
alter the composition of the court did not end with the elections, however. The Iowa
Legislature also entertained impeachment proceedings against the remaining justices who
had ruled in Varnum. See Bill Raftery, Resolutions Filed to Impeach 4 Iowa Supreme Court
Justices for Same Sex Marriage Decision, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.: GAVEL TO GAVEL (Apr. 22,
2011), http://gaveltogavel.us/2011/04/22/resolutions-filed-to-impeach-4-iowa-supreme-court-
justices-for-same-sex-marriage-decision/ [https://perma.cc/G3KK-9272] (citing H.R. 47, 84th
Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2011); H.R. 48, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2011); H.R. 49, 84th Gen.
Assemb. (Iowa 2011)). There is also a new selection process in place for the justices, which
gives more control to the governor. See Gruber-Miller, supra note 57.
121. Bill Raftery, For 2 Decades SC Senate Dem Tried to Expand Supreme Court from 5 to
7, Now It Is a House Republican Trying to Do the Same in 2013, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.:
GAVEL TO GAVEL (Jan. 2, 2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/2013/01/02/for-2-decades-sc-senate-dem-
tried-to-expand-supreme-court-from-5-to-7-now-it-is-a-house-republican-trying-to-do-the-
same-in-2013/ [https://perma.cc/U8NQ-VMPF]; see also S. 63, 118th Sess. (S.C. 2009), https://
www.scstatehouse.gov/sess118_2009-2010/bills/63.htm [https://perma.cc/Y2GR-CSRC]; S. 55,
118th Sess. (S.C. 2009), https://www.sc statehouse.gov/sess118_2009-2010/bills/55.htm
[https://perma.cc/57VL-M2RA]; S. 23, 117th Sess. (S.C. 2007), https://www.scstatehouse.gov/
sess117_2007-2008/bills/23.htm [https://perma.cc/Y57G-EBWH] (proposing to expand the
South Carolina Supreme Court).
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“[c]uriously” the bill was not introduced in the 2011-12 session.122
But in 2013, the bill was back—this time being put forward by a
Republican legislator,123 in a Republican-controlled General Assem-
bly.124 In light of the fact that the legislature selects the justices for
the supreme court,125 some have cast the latest move as an attempt
to pack the court by “[a] self-interested legislature[ ].”126 That said,
the bill did not progress beyond the Judiciary Committee.127
There is one final attempt to alter the size of a state supreme
court within the last decade that bears mentioning, though its
relationship to court packing is more tenuous. Unlike in the states
noted previously, justices in Louisiana are not appointed by one of
the political branches but elected to the bench in the first
instance.128 There are currently seven supreme court judicial
districts, which send one justice to the court apiece.129 (Those
districts have a storied past, and have long been the subject of
litigation related to the Voting Rights Act.130) In 2017, Democratic
Representative Marcus Hunter introduced Louisiana House Bill
406, which sought to create two additional supreme court districts,
out of the existing Districts 4 and 5.131
122. Raftery, supra note 121.
123. H.B. 3090, 120th Sess. (S.C. 2013), https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess120_2013-
2014/bills/3090.htm [https://perma.cc/YU93-JMKY]; Michael Pitts, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/Michael_Pitts [https://perma.cc/QV4T-3BDN].
124. Party Control of South Carolina State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballot
pedia.org/Party_control_of_South_Carolina_state_government [https://perma.cc/8979-EGTL]
(noting that Republicans held the legislative branch during the relevant time period).
125. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3.
126. John L. Warren III, Holding the Bench Accountable: Judges Qua Representatives, 6
WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 299, 326 (2014); see also Elizabeth L. Robinson, Revival of Roosevelt:
Analyzing Expansion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Light of the Resurgence of
State “Court-Packing” Plans, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1126, 1137-38 (2018).
127. See H.B. 3090, supra note 123.
128. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 4 (describing how the state shall be divided into supreme court
districts, with a justice elected from each).
129. Louisiana Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Louisiana_Supreme_
Court [https://perma.cc/28GY-9SXM].
130. Debbie Elliott, La. Court in Racially Charged Power Struggle, Again, NPR (Aug. 14,
2012, 3:33 AM), https://www.npr.org/2012/08/14/158603523/la-court-in-racially-charged-
power-struggle-again [https://perma.cc/MPR9-WXR3].
131. H.B. 406, 2017 Reg. Sess. (La. 2017), https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/View Document.
aspx?d=1030709 [https://perma.cc/XD2F-9RW9]; see Marcus Hunter, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/Marcus_Hunter [https://perma.cc/PFP5-ZMQR].
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It is not clear, on its face, what the impact of these changes would
have been. But if one looks to the voting patterns of each parish in
the 2016 presidential election (the election directly preceding the
proposed bill), one can make an educated guess. The new District 4-
A would retain most of the old District 4’s parishes; but the new
District 4-B would contain East Carroll Parish, Madison Parish, and
Tensas Parish132—which all went for Hillary Clinton in the 2016
election.133 It would further contain various precincts within More-
house Parish, Ouachita Parish, and West Carroll Parish, though,
unfortunately, it is not possible to tell from the publicly available
data how those individual precincts came out in the 2016 election.134
The picture is clearer with the new District 5-B, which would carve
East Baton Rouge Parish135—which went for Hillary Clinton136—out
of a conservative District 5.137 If the particular precincts added to
the proposed District 4-B historically went for Democrats, the
proposed legislation presumably would have added two more Demo-
cratic justices to a court that, at the time, was majority-Republican,
by four to three.138 The legislation appears to have stalled,
however.139 And in a noteworthy ending, the representative who
introduced Louisiana House Bill 406 has left the Louisiana State
132. See H.B. 406, supra note 131.
133. See Official Results: Tuesday, Nov. 8, 2016 by Parish, LA. SEC’Y OF STATE,
https://voterportal.sos.la.gov/graphical [https://perma.cc/55PY-EQ4H] [hereinafter Official
Results].
134. Although the website of the Louisiana Secretary of State offers voting records by
precincts, the particular precinct numbers within Morehouse Parish, Ouachita Parish, and
West Carroll Parish did not align with the precinct numbers noted in H.B. 406. Unfortunately,
repeated calls to the Secretary of State’s Office to clarify this matter were not returned.
135. See H.B. 406, supra note 131; Official Results, supra note 133.
136. See Official Results, supra note 133.
137. District 5 is composed of Ascension Parish, East Feliciana Parish, Iberville Parish,
Livingston Parish, Pointe Coupee Parish, West Baton Rouge Parish, and West Feliciana
Parish (in addition to East Baton Rouge Parish). See H.B. 406, supra note 131. These parishes
(excluding East Baton Rouge Parish) together voted for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton
in the 2016 Presidential Election, 114,962 to 48,380. By contrast, East Baton Rouge Parish
voted for Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump, 102,828 to 84,660. See Official Results, supra
note 133.
138. See Louisiana Supreme Court Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Louisiana_Supreme_Court_elections,_2016 [https://perma.cc/RC7X-9YKF]; Official Results,
supra note 133.
139. H.B. 406, supra note 131 (noting the bill’s current status as “Pending House and
Government Affairs—Considered 5/10/17”).
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Legislature and is now serving as a district judge from the 4th
Judicial District.140
2. Court-Unpacking Attempts and Successes 
Just as the political branches in various states have sought to
change the ideological makeup of the courts by “packing” or adding
seats, so too have they sought to change the makeup by “unpacking”
or subtracting seats. Indeed, court unpacking has been attempted
several times in various states over the last decade. 
One of the boldest attempts to unpack a state supreme court
occurred in Montana in 2011, when Republicans controlled both
houses and the governor was a Democrat.141 Montana House Bill
245 was intended to reduce the supreme court from seven to five
justices.142 Specifically, the bill sought to remove two seats that were
held by then-Justices James Nelson and Brian Morris143—two of the
more liberal members of that court.144 The bill’s sponsor, Republican
Derek Skees, was not shy about sharing one of his motivations
during his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee: “All of
us want tort reform.... [s]o how do we get tort reform? I would sug-
gest that if we took the Supreme Court from 7 down to 5, they have
a higher workload, guess who becomes our ally in tort reform? The
Supreme Court.”145 A member of a local chapter of the Republican
140. See Hunter Wins 4th Judicial District Judge Seat, MONROE NEWS STAR (Nov. 6, 2018,
10:53 PM), https://www.thenewsstar.com/story/news/2018/11/06/hunter-wins-4th-judicial-
district-judge-seat/1914406002/ [https://perma.cc/H5MU-MSGC].
141. See Party Control of Montana State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Party_control_of_Montana_state_government [https://perma.cc/LQ3L-URHU].
142. H.B. 245, 62d Leg. (Mont. 2011), http://laws.leg.mt.gov/legprd/LAW0203W$BSRV.
ActionQuery?P_SESS=20111&P_BLTP_BILL_TYP_CD=HB&P_BILL_NO=245&P_BILL_
DFT_NO=&P_CHPT_NO=&Z_ACTION=Find&P_ENTY_ID_SEQ2=&P_SBJT_SBJ_CD=&
P_ENTY_ID_SEQ= [https://perma.cc/VC3F-FDA5].
143. See Bill Raftery, Montana is Considering Shrinking Its Supreme Court, NAT’L CTR. FOR
ST. CTS.: GAVEL TO GAVEL (Jan. 10, 2011), http://gaveltogavel.us/2011/01/10/montana-is-
considering-shrinking-its-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/Z227-64MM].
144. This statement is based upon a common-space measure of state supreme court
ideology, developed by Professor Adam Bonica and Michael J. Woodruff. For a discussion of
their methodology, see Adam Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, A Common-Space Measure of
State Supreme Court Ideology, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 472 (2015). For access to the dataset that
notes the justices’ respective scores, see Adam Bonica, Stanford, https://web.stanford.edu/
~bonica/data.html [https://perma.cc/Z73X-5Y7K].
145. See Bill Raftery, Plan to Shrink Montana Supreme Court: Designed to Force the Court
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Party shared another purported benefit to the court-unpacking plan:
by “tak[ing] control of the reins of the Supreme Court” and
“show[ing] them who is in charge,” the supreme court would then be
more receptive to upcoming redistricting efforts led by Repub-
licans.146 Montana House Bill 245 eventually died in committee in
April 2011.147 
Six years later, in 2017, Oklahoma saw a proposal to reduce its
supreme court from nine to five justices.148 It is not entirely clear
what the motivation was behind Oklahoma House Bill 1699, but two
years earlier, the bill’s author, Republican Representative Kevin
Calvey, said that he would “walk across the street and douse
[him]self in gasoline and set [him]self on fire” in response to some
of the pro-choice decisions of that court, following a proposed bill
that would have given raises to the justices.149 Moreover, Republi-
cans controlled the state house, the state senate, and the governor-
ship at that time,150 and a majority of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma was appointed by former Democratic governors.151 And
according to the Brennan Center, the way in which Oklahoma
House Bill 1699 would have reduced the court’s membership would
“most likely have resulted in changed ideological control” of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in only two years time.152 No votes were
ever taken on the bill.153
into Tort Reform and out of Redistricting Lawsuits?, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.: GAVEL TO GAVEL
(Jan. 18, 2011), http://gaveltogavel.us/2011/01/18/plan-to-shrink-montana-supreme-court-
designed-to-force-the-court-into-tort-reform-and-out-of-redistricting-lawsuits/ [https://perma.
cc/P6NG-H2PV].
146. Id.
147. See H.B. 245, Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011), https://legiscan.com/MT/bill/ HB245/2011
[https://perma.cc/7JXZ-45LH].
148. See H.B. 1699, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017), http://www.oklegislature.gov/
BillInfo.aspx?Bill=HB1699&Session=1700 [https://perma.cc/NF5M-8CK8].
149. See M. Delatorre & Leslie Rangel, Oklahoma Lawmaker Threatens to Set Himself on
Fire Over Abortion Ruling, OKLA. NEWS 4 (Apr. 28, 2015, 9:55 AM), https://kfor.com/
2015/04/27/state-rep-calvey-i-would-set-myself-on-fire/ [https://perma.cc/NCU4-BVJ2].
150. See Party Control of Oklahoma State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballot
pedia.org/Party_control_of_Oklahoma_state_government [https://perma.cc/PFN8-54AD].
151. Legislative Assaults on State Courts—2018, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/legislative-assaults-state-courts-2018 [https://perma.
cc/JK2P-4AXC].
152. See id.
153. See H.B. 1699, supra note 148.
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And in a particularly dramatic interbranch display of hostility,
Republicans in the Washington State Senate introduced a bill in the
winter of 2013 to shrink the state supreme court from nine justices
to five,154 only six days after the court invalidated a controversial
state initiative that required a supermajority to pass a tax.155
Tension between the two branches had already been running high
a year earlier, when the court had decided that the state was not
fulfilling its constitutional duty to fund public education.156 Indeed,
the text of Washington Senate Bill 5867 referred to the court’s
decisions as the reason for reducing its size:
The state Constitution ... provides that there shall be five su-
preme court judges. For over one hundred years, the legislature
has seen fit by statute to add four additional justices to that au-
gust body ... Recent opinions by the Washington state supreme
court have demonstrated that this legislative decision may be
constitutionally problematic.157
Adding further to the hostility, the bill called upon the sitting
justices to meet “in public” and then draw straws to determine who
would remain on the court and who would be terminated.158 In what
appeared to be yet one more jab, one of the bill’s sponsors, Republi-
can state Senator Michael Baumgartner, said that the money saved
by eliminating four justices would be “automatically funneled” into
public education, to meet the requirements set forth by the court in
its earlier decision.159 It is no surprise that the proposal was quickly
branded as a plan to “unpack” the court—and one that threatened
judicial independence.160 Although the bill did not gain much
154. See S.B. 5867, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), https://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/
billdocs/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5867.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q22R-XVBL].
155. See Andrew Cohen, A “Court Unpacking Plan” Threatens Judicial Independence,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 8, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/“court-
unpacking-plan”-threatens-judicial-independence [https://perma.cc/AV6G-S6JC].
156. See Brian M. Rosenthal, Days After Losing State Supreme Court Case, Republicans
Seek to Lay Off Justices, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013, 6:11 PM), http://blogs.seattle
times.com/politicsnorthwest/2013/03/06/days-after-losing-state-supreme-court-case-
republicans-seek-to-lay-off-justices/ [https://perma.cc/GTR3-8MY2].
157. S.B. 5867, supra note 154.
158. Id.
159. See Rosenthal, supra note 156.
160. See Cohen, supra note 155.
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momentum in 2013, variations of it have been proposed in the
Washington Legislature in the past several years,161 including
Washington House Bill 1081 in 2019.162
Finally, it is worth noting two additional attempts to shrink state
supreme courts from the past decade, although the motivations
behind them are unclear. In 2009 in Alabama, Democratic Senate
Majority Leader Zeb Little introduced a bill to reduce the state
supreme court from nine justices to seven, by attrition.163 But unlike
in some of the other states noted here, the court was not closely
divided; indeed, all of the court’s members were Republican, apart
from then-Chief Justice Sue Bell Cobb.164 That bill died when the
legislature adjourned in May of 2009.165 Similarly, in 2014 in
Pennsylvania, the Republican-controlled Pennsylvania General
Assembly considered reducing the size of its supreme court from
seven to five members, via constitutional amendment.166 That
proposal, however, was but one piece of a large reform bill, which
would have abolished the Office of Lieutenant Governor, reduced
the size of the General Assembly itself, and reduced the size of the
superior court.167 The bill, which had eighteen sponsors of both
parties, died by July of that year.168 These episodes are noteworthy
161. See H.B. 2784, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016), https://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/
billdocs/2015-16/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/2784.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7W4-9LWT]; S.B. 6088,
63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014), https://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2013-14/Pdf/
Bills/Senate%20Bills/6088.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PVE-3GFP].
162. See H.B. 1081, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019), https://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/
billdocs/2019-20/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1081.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8VK-SCNZ].
163. S.B. 507, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2009).
164. Specifically, the Alabama Supreme Court members in 2009 were: Chief Justice Sue
Bell Cobb (Democrat), Associate Justice Michael Bolin (Republican), Associate Justice Champ
Lyons, Jr. (Republican), Associate Justice Glenn Murdock (Republican), Associate Justice Tom
Parker (Republican), Associate Justice Greg Shaw (Republican), Associate Justice Patricia
Smith (Republican), Associate Justice Lyn Stuart (Republican), and Associate Justice Thomas
Woodall (Republican). See Annual Statistics for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2010,
SUP. CT. ALA., http://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/2010_SCStats.pdf [https://perma.cc/69RM-
P3ER].
165. See Entry for Alabama SB 507: Last Action, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.: GAVEL TO GAVEL,
https://www.ncsc.org/gaveltogavel [https://perma.cc/4HPB-M3YQ] (noting that the bill died
when the legislature adjourned on May 15, 2009).
166. See S.B. 324, Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2013) (as amended June 9, 2014), https://
www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessYr=2013
&sessInd=0&billBody=S&billTyp=B&billNbr=0324&pn=2110 [https://perma.cc/H5XC-Z3SY].
167. See id.
168. See Legislative History of S.B. 324, Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2013) (as amended June 9,
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in that they show a general willingness on the part of some to tinker
with the size of the supreme court, but again, they do not seem to
clearly fit into the mold of court packing and unpacking attempts as
plainly as earlier examples.
B. Observations About States that Changed and Attempted to
Change Their Courts (and Those that Did Not)
The preceding analysis documents how there have been numerous
attempts in the last decade to both increase and decrease the size of
state supreme courts for what appears to be political gain.169 One
question that naturally follows is whether anything of a more gener-
alized nature can be said about this set of attempts (and successes)
and the state environments in which they arose.
Before turning to this question, it is important, at the outset, to
stress the need for circumspection. Although it would be tempting
to try to extrapolate a great deal from the episodes discussed above,
doing so would be unwise. First, as noted earlier, it is possible that
the dataset is underinclusive.170 Second, there are significant dif-
ferences across the fifty states along such points as the size and
structure of their highest court, how their justices are selected (or
elected), the history of the relationship between the judicial and
political branches, and the political climate of the state more
generally—to name just a few.171 To make strong claims about why
certain reform measures were attempted in some states and not
others, for example, would require a deep-dive analysis across all of
these points, across all fifty states, and across each year in a span
of at least ten years. This is an undertaking for future scholarship,
and beyond the scope of this symposium Article. Nevertheless, it is
still possible to make some observations about the proposed bills at
issue here and their respective states. What follows, then, is a set
of modest claims about the data and several questions worth
probing in future research. 
2014), https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/bill_history.cfm?syear=2013&sind=
0&body=S&type=B&bn=324 [https://perma.cc/6XXH-UAJ4].
169. See supra Part II.A.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 57-66.
171. See supra Part II.A.
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First, one can begin with potential commonalities among the
proposed bills and/or states that saw attempts to alter their state
supreme courts. The most discernible pattern is also the one that
should be least surprising: it appears that various elected officials
pushed for changes to their state supreme court when doing so was
in their political interest. Specifically, several of the states in which
there were proposals to expand or contract the court had the
following features: a legislature that was of the same party as the
governor; a selection method for justices that hinged on appoint-
ment by the governor; and a closely divided supreme court.172 To be
sure, not all of the examples here fit this pattern. To wit, the
proposal to expand the Louisiana State Supreme Court would have
done so by adding districts for popular election.173 And the Arizona
State Supreme Court was not “ideologically balanced” before its
recent expansion; four of the five justices in 2016 were Republican
appointees (although the court arguably became more conservative
after the change).174 Notwithstanding these exceptions, the larger
point holds: the proposed attempts to alter the courts were often
done in ways that would guarantee adding justices from a political
party to shift the ideological makeup of the court in a considerable
way.
One might wonder if there are meaningful points in common
between the two states that did, in fact, alter the size of their
supreme courts in recent years: Arizona and Georgia. With such a
small set—and again, so many potentially relevant factors—it is
possible only to offer a few observations. The two states shared
several of the features highlighted above: both state legislatures
were majority Republican and both governors at the time were
Republican.175 Furthermore, the governors in both states had the
172. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 88-114, 148-53 (discussing proposed legis-
lation in Florida, Georgia, and Oklahoma).
173. See H.B. 406, supra note 131.
174. See Maria Polletta, By Adding Justices to the Arizona Supreme Court, Did Ducey Help
the State—Or Help Himself?, AZCENTRAL.COM (July 8, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.
azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2019/07/08/arizona-governor-said-expanding-
supreme-court-would-bring-benefits-has-it-doug-ducey/2842733002/ [https://perma.cc/S46E-
5JR9]. With the retirement of Chief Justice Scott Bales in August 2019, all of the current
justices were appointed by Republican governors, including five by current Governor Doug
Ducey. See Meet the Justices, ARIZ. JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.azcourts.gov/Meetthe-
Justices [https://perma.cc/5SEQ-BZQD].
175. For Arizona, see Arizona Elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
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opportunity to fill the two new seats on the court.176 The prime
difference, as noted above, is that while the expansion changed the
ideological makeup of the court in Georgia, it only added to the seats
held by Republican appointees in Arizona.177 A final point about the
two “success stories” bears mentioning. As alluded to earlier, some
states—indeed, nearly half—require a constitutional amendment in
order to change the composition of the court.178 By contrast, nearly
half permit the state legislature to set the size of the court by
statute.179 The states have different requirements for amending
their constitutions but, by and large, it is an easier lift, politically-
speaking, to enact legislation than it is to change one’s consti-
tution.180 Accordingly, it might not be surprising that the two states
that saw changes to their high courts could do so via legislation
alone (and correspondingly, perhaps not surprising that some of the
states that saw failed attempts would have required constitutional
change).181
Second, it is worth examining key differences across attempts to
change the size of state courts. One plain variation is the means by
which the elected branches sought to alter the size of the court—
by adding or subtracting seats. The decision to pursue one option
over the other seems contingent upon at least a few different fac-
tors. The first is the starting size of the court. If a court begins with
five justices—the smallest size of a state supreme court in the
Arizona_elections,_2014 [https://perma.cc/CM9Z-MNJP] (noting that following the 2014
elections, the Republican party held the governorship, as well as a majority in both the state
senate and state house); for Georgia, see Georgia Elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/Georgia_elections,_2014 [https://perma.cc/URF7-QNY5] (similarly noting that,
following the 2014 elections, the Republican party maintained a “trifecta” within state
government).
176. See supra notes 84-86, 95-98 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 94-98 and 174.
178. See Raftery, supra note 11, at 6.
179. See id.
180. See The Book of the States 2018: State Constitutions, COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS,
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/1.3.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z7A-MCKW]
(noting that a majority of states require a legislative vote of two-thirds or three-fifths for
proposing an amendment, often followed by a majority vote on the amendment). This is not
to suggest, however, that the process is onerous in every state. Scholars have previously noted
the “malleability” of state constitutions generally. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll,
Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517,
1517 (2009).
181. See supra Part II.A.
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country182—it would be difficult to justify reducing seats. (Con-
versely, if a court begins with nine justices—the largest size of a
state supreme court in the country183—it would be hard to argue
that more seats were necessary.) Thus, even elected officials who
were purely motivated by politics would be constrained by the
starting size of the court. But another relevant factor, to be sure, is
how additions or attritions would affect the court. For example,
Oklahoma’s House Bill 1699 would have reduced the state supreme
court from nine justices to five, in a way that observers predicted
would have swung the court from majority Democrat to majority
Republican.184 And Georgia’s House Bill 927 increased the state
supreme court by two justices, taking it from 4-3 majority Democrat
to 5-4 majority Republican.185 Finally, at the extreme end of the
examples noted earlier, there is Florida’s House Joint Resolution
7111, which would have added more justices by splitting the state
supreme court into two and doing so in a way that would have
sidelined the Democratic appointees over in the criminal court.186
Another noteworthy difference is the set of events that preceded
the proposed legislation—and specifically, whether the proposed
reform was framed as a response to a particular case or legal issue.
In several of the states noted here, the legislature and state su-
preme court had just been through a public dust-up. In Florida, for
example, the state supreme court had recently struck down the
state’s school voucher system as unconstitutional when Senate Bill
408 was proposed to increase the number of justices.187 Making the
point finer still, the bill stated explicitly that it was in response to
the court’s decision, which it called “specious” and a display of “judi-
cial activism.”188 In Washington, too, attempts to alter the size of the
supreme court were styled as a reaction to earlier court decisions as
182. See State Court Organization: Number of Appellate Court Judges, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST.
CTS., http://data.ncsc.org/QvAjaxZfc/QvsViewClient.aspx?public=only&size=long&host=QVS
%40qlikviewisa&name=Temp/1f3d14e005ea4c1ca38efe385fc46e45.html [https://perma.cc/
QF9L-5R93] (noting the number of judges on the state courts of last resort, which vary
between five and nine).
183. See id.
184. See BRENNAN CTR., supra note 151.
185. Supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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the text of Senate Bill 5867 underscored.189 Similarly, Iowa’s House
Joint Resolution 2012 to expand the state supreme court came on
the heels of the court’s Varnum decision, which found an Iowa law
that limited marriage to opposite-sex couples unconstitutional.190
And while perhaps not motivated by a particular case, the author of
Montana’s House Bill 245 suggested that the bill was proposed, at
least in part, by a desire to bring about tort reform.191 That said,
quite a few of the proposed bills appear “unprovoked.” With some,
the suggestion was that altering the court was akin to acquiring an
insurance policy; the legislative branches were arguably helping to
ensure that future legislation would be upheld as constitutional192—
through changing the makeup of the court or affecting the behavior
of current justices.193
Finally, in a similar vein, there are key differences when it comes
to whether the particular proposed legislation was part of a larger
reform effort, or a more targeted bill aimed solely at altering the
state’s supreme court. For example, the original reform effort in
Georgia would have added judges to the intermediate appellate
court at the same time that it would have added to the court of last
resort.194 Although the bill that eventually passed maintained the
size of the Georgia Court of Appeals, it did alter the jurisdiction of
both that court and the Georgia Supreme Court.195 Similarly, the
proposal in Pennsylvania was part of a larger reform effort.196 Many
of the other efforts—say, to increase the size of the Louisiana
Supreme Court and to decrease the size of the Washington Supreme
189. See supra notes 156-57.
190. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., supra note 113 and accompanying text.
193. This latter set of examples can be more generally understood as “power plays” on the
part of the legislature. See Miriam Seifter, Judging Power Plays in the American States, 97
TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1223-24 (2019) (defining “power plays as actions that alter or aggressively
leverage institutional power and do so for partisan ends, in either of two senses: that the actor
would not make the same institutional argument if the parties were reversed, or that the
actor is undermining apparent majority preferences for self-entrenching purposes” (footnote
omitted)).
194. See S.B. 429, supra note 90.
195. See H.B. 927, supra note 93.
196. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
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Court—appear to be focused only on altering the size of the state’s
court of last resort.197
* * * 
In short, the past decade has seen a significant number of
attempts to alter state supreme courts—both through proposed
packing and unpacking. Indeed, a few of those attempts have been
successful, leading to fundamentally altered state courts of last
resort. To be sure, further research is needed to gain a better
understanding of why these proposals were made in these states at
this time, why some were successful, and why some states saw no
such proposals at all. But the preceding analysis does bring to light
the variation among proposals and at least some of the circum-
stances that led to them. Though elected officials tended to push for
judicial change when it appeared to suit them politically, the
ultimate proposals took many forms across many states. The final
question is what these findings might mean for the larger discourse
around court packing.
III. LESSONS FOR THE LARGER DEBATE AND THE COURTS
THEMSELVES
While scholars and politicians continue to debate whether Re-
publicans unpacked the Supreme Court in 2016, and whether Dem-
ocrats should pack the Court if they take the Oval Office and the
Senate in 2020, they should not overlook the clear instances of court
packing that have recently taken place. As Part II discusses, there
were attempts in more than 20 percent of all states in the last de-
cade to alter the size of the state supreme court, with two of them
successful. What could this state of play mean for the federal courts?
There are different ways to interpret the data from Part II. The
most straightforward interpretation, it would seem, is that the norm
against court packing might be more vulnerable than some have
thought—at least as it concerns the state courts. After all, if court
packing and unpacking were considered strictly verboten, one would
197. See, e.g., H.B. 406, supra note 131; S.B. 5867, supra note 154.
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not expect to see over twenty different bills to pack and unpack the
highest court in eleven different states.
One response to this interpretative claim is that while there were
indeed numerous attempts to pack or unpack the courts, only two
of those attempts were actually successful. In this way, one could
argue, the story of Part II is a cautionary tale and simply reinforces
the message that the elected branches would be wise to save their
political capital. There may be credence to this response, but it is
worth noting that when proposed bills did not succeed in the first
instance, they were often attempted again. Specifically, in this time
period, representatives tried to expand the Arizona Supreme Court
several times over a five-year span before ultimately succeeding
with Arizona House Bill 2537.198 Likewise, the Washington State
Legislature has considered at least three different house and senate
bills since 2013 to reduce the state’s supreme court from nine mem-
bers to five.199 These data points do not mean that it is necessarily
worth the time and political capital of the various elected officials to
pursue these reforms. But again, if proposals to pack or unpack the
courts were seen as completely illegitimate, one would expect a swift
public rebuke after one was brought forward—assuming the
proposal garnered sufficient attention—and no subsequent at-
tempts. It is hard to imagine President Roosevelt, for example, con-
tinuing to push for his court-packing plan several times more after
its failure. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the
convention against court packing is not completely robust at the
state level—at least it has not been in recent years.
The response to this claim might be that the status of court
packing at the state level has little bearing on its status at the
federal level. After all, most state justices are elected200 and so their
courts are seen as necessarily more political in nature when
compared to Article III courts. As such, there is no reason to think
that attempts to pack the U.S. Supreme Court would be tolerated
simply because they were in Arizona and Georgia.
It is certainly true that the courts, and therefore the norms
around them, are different, but perhaps less so than one might
198. See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 49.
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think. Many of the state supreme courts in which court packing has
been attempted are states in which the governor appoints the
justices in the first instance. Indeed, this is presumably why those
courts lent themselves to court packing; it was clear what kind of
justice—conservative or liberal—would be packed. Accordingly, this
subset of state courts is not quite so removed from their federal
analogue as it would appear at first blush.
That said, within those states that rely on gubernatorial appoint-
ment for the selection of their justices, there can be key differences.
As noted earlier, the governor of Arizona selects justices for the
state supreme court from a short list compiled by a merit selection
committee. This facet of the process, of course, further distinguishes
it from the federal model—a point that was seized upon when the
Arizona bill became law. Specifically, the sponsor of the bill noted
that he might have felt “less comfortable” if there was a “different
person appointing.”201 The governor himself made the same point:
Some, particularly national activists and media who aren’t fa-
miliar with our system here, have inaccurately described this as
“court packing.” That’s just wrong. Arizona’s two new justices
will be selected under our state’s nationally-renowned merit
selection system, which includes nominations of qualified ap-
plicants by the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments.
The fact is, unlike the federal system, I can’t simply appoint
anyone.202
What the governor’s comments obscure, however, is that he can
nevertheless select more conservative (or liberal) justices from the
list of nominees, and therefore can still “pack” the court as desired.
His comments also fail to mention that the governor largely
populates the Commission himself,203 further guaranteeing a list of
candidates he will find to his liking.204 The larger point is that while
201. Benen, supra note 84.
202. Ducey, supra note 85.
203. See ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 36.
204. This appears to have been the case in Arizona. Specifically, Governor Ducey appointed
former Maricopa County Attorney William Montgomery to succeed Scott Bales on the Arizona
Supreme Court. Montgomery was not nominated for a preceding vacancy. See Polletta, supra
note 174. The governor then appointed several new members to the nominating commission,
which nominated Montgomery and six others for the vacancy resulting from Chief Justice
Bales’s retirement. Id. Some observers contended that Ducey had “packed” the nominating
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one might think there are significant differences between the selec-
tion processes of these state supreme courts and the U.S. Supreme
Court, those differences fade upon a close examination. Accordingly,
the status of the norm against court packing within these states
may be worth heeding by federal court watchers.
Those watchers should further take note of the fact that court-
packing attempts are on the rise. According to Bill Raftery of the
National Center for State Courts in 2016—before some of the at-
tempts noted here—the previous decade had witnessed a “dramatic
uptick” in proposed legislation to change the composition of state
supreme courts.205 There had been considerably less legislation in
the preceding decades, and only five successful attempts to change
the size of a state’s highest court between 1980 and 2013.206 This is
surely an empirical question to be tested, but if a substantial por-
tion of the population views the court systems as comparable, then
seeing that court packing and unpacking is attempted more and
more in the states might make it become less and less of an “off the
wall” proposal with the federal courts. That is, if the public becomes
increasingly acclimated to these types of bills, the threshold may be
lowered at the federal level, thereby increasing the chances of court
packing in Article III courts.
There is one final point to consider, further bringing us back to
the symposium’s theme of the role of courts in politically charged
times. Much of this Article has focused on how courts are being
treated in such times, but there is a concluding question about how
those courts are reacting. One of the critical moments in FDR’s
court-packing attempt is the Court’s own about-face—the “switch in
time that saved ... nine.”207 To be sure, while some legislative
attempts noted in Part II were made with an interest in seeing them
passed, others presumably were aimed at bringing the justices in
line. There are important questions about the role of justices in such
moments, and whether they should act with an eye toward staving
off attempts to restructure their court.208 As further work is done to
understand the swelling tide of attempts to curb the independence
committee to secure his desired nominee. See id.
205. See Raftery, supra note 11, at 7.
206. See id.
207. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
208. See Grove, supra note 2, at 471.
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of courts at the state level, more should be done on how the courts
themselves have responded in these times.209
CONCLUSION
When it comes to understanding our own court systems, the
states are in many ways the “final frontier.” Relatively little is
known about them as compared to the federal courts, and so it
should be unsurprising that they have been omitted from the larger
debate around court packing. This Article has shown why awareness
of, and future research on, the state courts would be of great value.
In particular, more needs to be understood about how the states
that have attempted court packing (and unpacking) came to do so.
What role did political climate and polarization play? Was altering
the size of the court viewed as more or less legitimate following a
controversial ruling by the state supreme court? Was it viewed as
more or less legitimate when packaged as part of a larger suite of
reforms or when it was framed as a stand-alone issue? Along these
last lines, more research is needed on other court-curbing measures
undertaken in the states, from salary changes to court jurisdiction,
and how justices have responded in the face of such proposals.210
There is much to be learned about matters that relate generally to
the independence of our courts.
Returning, finally, to the court-packing debate, it seems the
question of whether reforms should be attempted will continue to
live on through at least the next political cycle, and probably well
into the future. It is critical to understand the positive dimension of
the issue—to fully appreciate where court packing has taken place
and its effects—while engaging in the normative dimension. As part
of this, it is worth remembering that states and their courts are
indeed our laboratories, for good and for ill.
209. Political scientists have noted key ways in which the Justices exercise “self-restraint”
in the face of legislative proposals by Congress to curb the Court’s independence. See TOM S.
CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 15-16 (2011). There has been far less
scholarship on the way state supreme court justices respond to pressures by other branches
of government, and more would be extremely valuable. For one notable example, see generally
LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2002).
210. As one example of the type of scholarship that is needed today on his score, see
Meghan E. Leonard, State Legislatures, State High Courts, and Judicial Independence: An
Examination of Court-Curbing Legislation in the States, 37 JUST. SYS. J. 53 (2016).
